Turkey as an EU candidate country

AHIF Policy Journal

Volume 9: Spring 2018

Turkey as an EU candidate country
Despina Afentouli

In 1987, Turkey applied for full membership to the European Union (EU), yet the
European-Turkish relations have been tested in a number of ways. Turkey’s EU
candidacy has caused contradicting points of view, including the future of the European
Union. The negotiation process includes the harmonization of the Turkish law with the
European law – this is one of the most challenging parts. In 2006, from the 35 subject areas
of law (chapters), 8 chapters could not be opened and no chapters can be provisionally
closed if Turkey will not apply the ‘Additional Protocol to the Ankara Association
Agreement’ to Cyprus.1

The EU enlargement
According to the European Parliament Director General for external policies of the
Union and Policy analyst for the Western Balkans and Turkey, André De Munter, “The
EU’s enlargement policy aims to unite European countries in a common political and
economic project. Guided by the Union’s values and subject to strict conditions,
enlargement has proved to be one of the most successful tools in promoting political,
economic and societal reforms, and in consolidating peace, stability and democracy
across the continent. Enlargement policy also enhances the EU’s presence on the global
stage.”2

In other words, there is a legal framework (conditions) to be followed by any
European state in order to become a member of the EU. On the Treaty of Lisbon- the
Treaty of the EU, Article 49 explains which states are eligible to apply and on Article 2 of
the Treaty of the European Union, the EU’s founding values are presented.3

During the EU’s integration process, it is necessary of any candidate or potential
candidate country to following the Copenhagen criteria (1993), including:

 the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human
rights and respect for and protection of minorities;

 a functioning market economy and the ability to cope with competitive
pressure and market forces within the EU;

 the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including by adhering
to the aims of political, economic and monetary union, and adopting the
common rules, standards and policies that make up the body of EU law (the
acquis communautaire).”4

The European Council also approved the “renewed consensus on enlargement’
(2006), which was based not only, on ‘consolidation, conditionality and communication’,
but also on the EU’s capacity to integrate new members; the Treaty of Lisbon was
adopted, to change the composition and work of the most important EU institutions, so
that the enlargement would not affect EU policymaking.”5

Regarding the process towards joining the EU, a country applies first to the
Council and then, the Council asks the opinion of the Commission about it. It must be
noted that the European Parliament is informed about this certain application.
Depending on the Commission’s opinion, the European Council has the opportunity to
decide by unanimity, whether to grant the candidate status to the applicant country. The
Commission gives a recommendation and then the Council unanimously decides about
opening the negotiations or not.6

The EU legislation includes over 30 policy chapters. More specifically, the EU
Acquis, which is 130,000 pages, consists of 35 chapters, including “the content, principles
and political objectives of the Treaties on which the Union is founded; legislation and
decisions adopted pursuant to the Treaties, and the case law of the Court of Justice; other
acts, legally binding or not, adopted within the Union framework […] and other acts
within the framework of the common foreign and security policy […], of justice and home
affairs; international agreements concluded by the Communities, the Communities
jointly with their Member States, the Union, and those concluded by the Member States
among themselves with regard to Union activities;” the EU Acquis is constantly
developing as new rules and regulations are integrated.7

Prior to the beginning of the negotiations, the Commission provides a so-called
“screening” report chapter by chapter. The “screening process,” which “is the
preparatory stage of accession negotiations […], forms the basis for the bilateral
negotiations between the European Union and the various candidate countries, […]
allowing the latter to familiarize themselves with EU law and demonstrate their capacity
to put it into effect […]” and helps “…to identify those areas of EU law in which progress
is needed if the candidate countries’ legislation is to be compatible with EU rules. These
areas are divided into chapters, which are negotiated individually,” whereas, “A further
screening exercise may be carried out during the accession negotiations if EU law has
been updated” 8

Based on the Commission’s recommendation, the Council agrees unanimously
whether it should open each new negotiation chapter. If progress is considered satisfactory, the Commission can recommend ‘provisionally closing’ a chapter and decide
unanimously. As soon as negotiations on all the policy chapters are finished, the terms
and conditions – safeguard clauses and transitional arrangements may also be included –
are included into an accession treaty between the EU Member States and the candidate
state. Only if the Parliament agrees and the Council approves by unanimity, the accession
treaty can be signed; it is then submitted by all contracting states for ratification,
according to their constitutional requirements (for instance ratification by parliament or
referendum).9

According to the Article 49 of the Treaty of the EU, the role of the European
Parliament is important on the financial sides of accession, as, according to the Treaty of
Lisbon, the Parliament’s opinion is necessary for implementing the multiannual financial
framework (MFF). Its budgetary powers influence directly “the amounts allocated to the
Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA).”10

The European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs assigns “standing
rapporteurs for all candidate and potential candidate countries,” exchanges regularly
points of view with the Commissioner responsible for enlargement negotiations, highlevel
government officials, civil society representatives, and experts. The European
Parliament presents its positions on the annual resolutions, as an answer to the
Commission’s latest annual ‘country reports’. The European Parliaments resolutions on
the EU’s enlargement strategy determine the policy. Regular bilateral relations are kept
between the European Parliament and the parliaments of candidate and potential
candidate countries through the Parliament’s delegations; these are discussed with their
counterparts’ issues, which are related to the EU accession process. 11

The Case of Turkey

Two years afterthe creation of the European Economic Community (EEC), in 1959,
Turkey was one of the first countries striving for co-operation with EEC Soon after, on
September 12, 1963, the “Agreement Creating An Association Between the Republic of
Turkey and the European Economic Community,” known as the “Ankara Agreement,”
was signed, which, as it was mentioning, aimed “to ensure a continuous improvement in
living conditions in Turkey and in the European Economic Community through
accelerated economic progress and the harmonious expansion of trade, and to reduce the
disparity between the Turkish economy and the economies of the Member States of the
Community;” the Agreement also included a Customs Union (CU), so as Turkey to be in
the position to freely trade goods and agricultural products with countries within the
EEC.12

Turkey’s full membership application was submitted to the European Council on
April 14, 1987. The negotiations began in 1993, whereas in 1996, the Customs Union between the EU and Turkey was created. In 1999, the country was granted the candidate
status at the Helsinki Summit. To be noted that in 1999, with the US encouragement,13
Greece and Turkey a discussion was initiated on Confidence Building Measures (CBMs)
on the occasion of high significance political issues; as a result, the Greek government
approved Turkey’s path to Europe. The European Council in Helsinki declared that the
political solution of the Cyprus Issue will facilitate the Cyprus accession to the EU in 2004,
without, however, this to be a precondition.14

The EU-Turkey Accession Partnership was adopted by the EU Council on March
8, 200. This was actually a plan for Turkey on how to join the EU. Eleven days later, the
“National Program for the Adoption of the Acquis” (NPAA), namely the EU law, was
adopted by the Turkish government. In September 2001, during the Copenhagen
Summit, the EU Council approved the increase of the EU financial support (“preaccession
instrument.15)

In 2005, negotiations were opened. During the screening process, out of the 35
chapters, 16 were opened to negotiations and only one chapter “(“25-Science and
Research”) had been provisionally closed. In December 11, 2006, “The negotiations on 8
chapters cannot be opened (“1-Free Movement of Goods,” “3-Right of Establishment and
Freedom to Provide Services,” “9-Financial Services,” “11-Agriculture and Rural
Development,” “13-Fisheries,” “14-Transport Policy,” “29-Customs Union” and “30-
External Relations” ) as a result of the EU Council decision of December 2006 and no
chapters can be provisionally closed on the grounds that Turkey does not undertake its
obligations stemming from the Additional Protocol to Ankara Agreement in its
entirety”16 and therefore, “until Turkey applies the ‘Additional Protocol to the Ankara
Association Agreement’ to Cyprus.”17

On May 17, 2012, the “Positive Agenda” was launched with Turkey by the
European Commission to revive their relations. “Positive Agenda should bring fresh
dynamics and new momentum into our relations,” explained EU’s Enlargement
Commissioner, Stefan Fule, at a joint press conference with Turkey’s EU Minister Egemen
Bagis in Ankara. “Our aim is to keep the accession process alive and put it properly back
on track after a period of stagnation which has been a source of frustration for both sides,”
he added, stressing that the Agenda “was not to replace, but to complement and support
Turkey’s accession process.” The EU’s Enlargement Commissioner also “listed these
areas as alignment with EU legislation, political reforms and fundamental rights, visa,
mobility and migration, trade, energy, counter-terrorism and dialogue on foreign policy”
and stressed that “the task of the working groups created within the scope of Positive
Agenda would be to accelerate the process of alignment of Turkey with EU policies and
standards under eight chapters” and “that the Positive Agenda aimed at bringing back
credibility to Turkey’s EU accession process.”18

The EU Commission’s Enlargement Strategy Paper referred to the proposal of
creating a ”Positive Agenda” in Turkish-EU relations and mentioned, as the key elements
of this agenda “intensified dialogue and cooperation in political reforms, visa, mobility
and migration, energy, fight against terrorism, more Turkish participation in the
Community programs, sister cities, trade and the Customs Union and support for efforts
to comply with the acquis” and predicted informal talks between the Commission and
Turkey on the eight blocked chapters.19

The Working Groups meetings seemed to have a positive outcome, as Turkey met
four closing standards in the “Company Law,” “Consumer and Health Protection” and
“Financial Control” chapters. Thus, the developments on Turkish membership were
crucial later on; a new negotiating chapter focusing on regional policy and coordinating
structural instruments was opened in 2013 and in 2015, a chapter on economic and
monetary policy was opened on December 14 following the EU-Turkey meeting of
November 29.20

2016 seemed to also be a crucial year for EU-Turkey relations; on March 18, a
mutual action plan to stop the movement of irregular migrants to EU and reactivation of
Turkey’s membership procedure were reconfirmed, as well as the acceleration of the visa
liberalization process was agreed. On June 30, an additional negotiating chapter, which
was focused on financial and budgetary provisions, was opened. However, in July, due
to the “attempted coup” in Turkey, the European Parliament adopted a resolution
(November), calling for freezing temporarily the ongoing negotiations with Turkey’s
membership.21

After the leaders’ discussion at the EU Council, in October 2017, the College
discussed Turkey’s pre-accession support. The Commissioner for European
Neighborhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, Johannes Hahn, outlined the
current pre-accession support, and what should be done next. The European Commission
will show alternatives “on the adaptation of the indicative financial allocations for Turkey
for the years 2018-2020.” These will be shown to the General Affairs Council (GAC) in
December 2017, so as a political decision to be taken. Until then, following the Presidency
conclusions of the previous year’s GAC (December 2016). The Commission was currently
aimed at ongoing pre-accession funding on important areas such as fundamental rights,
the rule of law, civil society, and people-to-people contacts. These areas would be
preserved in future support programs.22

On November 30, 2017, “the Council and the European Parliament separately
approved the deal reached on 18 November 2017 in the conciliation committee on the
2018 budget,” namely the EU budget for year 2018 is adopted; taken into account the
situation in Turkey, regarding democracy, human rights, press freedom, and rule of law,
“its pre-accession funds have been cut by €105 million compared to the Commission’s initial proposal, with a further €70 million held in reserve until the country makes
“measurable sufficient improvements” in these fields.”23

Issues Regarding Turkey’s EU membership

Turkey’s EU candidacy has caused contradicting points of view, regarding the
future of the European Union itself. Turkey’s population is large. It is estimated that by
year 2020, Turkey will have the largest population within the EU (87 million inhabitants).
This means that Turkey would play a leading role within the EU, as it would elect the
largest number of members of the European Parliament. It is expected, that the Turkish
accession would cost 11.3 billion per year on farming subsidies.24

On financial terms, according to a research analysis on Turkey’s economy by the
Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdom published on 2014, Turkey is
the fastest emerging market in Europe and OECD. Its GDP per capita is larger than that
of both Bulgaria and Romania combined. Other facts on the same report show that
Turkey has the highest number of youth population, the fourth largest labor force in
comparison to 27 European countries and that according to HSBC’s “The World in 2050”
report, Turkey is expected to be the world’s twelfth and Europe’s fifth largest economy
until 2050. Moreover, Turkey has been in the Customs Union since 1995 and has free trade
agreements and negotiations with many other countries.25

All the data show that the balance of the trade within the countries of the European
Union by Turkey’s accession might lead to instability. Thus, the opponents of Turkey’s
EU accession question whether Turkey can really be a part of the EU because the
conditions during the time Turkey applied where different to today; the Eurozone crisis
has led the EU to have a more federal approach to law, politics and fiscal matters and
stress that the political union of Europe will be threatened because of Turkey’s EU
membership, whereas those who support Turkey’s membership are also supporters of
the free trade.

Supporters of Turkey’s EU accession believe that Turkey’s geographical position
will increase Europe’s role at international level; through Turkey, Europe will extend to
regions with key natural resources and will increase its Common Foreign and Security
Policy. The fact that Turkey is NATO’s second largest military force is also a contributing
factor to this (The United States of America have the first largest military force in NATO).

It must be noted that according to Yalcin Topcu, who is the adviser of Turkey’s
President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey needs to reexamine its NATO membership and
withdraw about 40 troops from the organization in Norway, after he found out that
Turkey’s founder, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, and President Erdogan were described as
“enemies” at a stand with “enemies’” portraits during NATO’s “Trident Javelin” exercise on November 8-17, 2017 in Norway. NATO’s Secretary-General, Jens Stoltenberg, and
Norway’s Defense Minister, Frank Bakke-Jensen, apologized to Turkey over the incident
(Mail Online, 2017), which Turkish officials have described as one of the “greatest
scandals” in the alliance’s history.26

One of the most crucial issues of Turkey’s EU candidacy is the religion. Turkey is
a secular state, namely it has not an official religion, yet it will be the first Muslim country
to join the EU, since most of its citizens are Muslims. The Economist has noted that, “In
fact, Turkey is far from secular, if that implies an arm’s-length relationship between faith
and politics as the chief imam is a civil servant and the head of the Religious Affairs
Directorate, which is the top religious authority in Turkey.’27 Despite the fact that Turkey
officially recognizes the freedom of religion, the question is whether all minorities have
been equally treated in Turkey. The German pastor J Lepsius said on January 31, 1917,
that the expulsion of the Greeks and the Armenians was a program of two phases – the
extinction of the Christian elements in Turkey.28 Taken into account that Europe is mainly
Christian and has a different culture from Turkey, the question remains on what the
future of Europe will be if Turkey joins the EU.

Turkey’s Armenian Genocide recognition was an issue of discussion on whether
this should be a condition for Turkey to join the European Union. More than twenty
countries, including Argentina, Belgium, Canada, France, Italy, Russia, as well as Pope
Francis, the European Parliament and the United Nations Sub-Commission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, have all officially recognized
Armenian genocide. Other countries, such as the United Kingdom, the United States of
America and Israel are using another terminology to define what genocide is. Turkey
reacted, refused to recognize the Armenian genocide and did not accept such as
precondition to enter the EU. In 2006, the EU Parliament voted against a proposal to
include the Armenian genocide recognition as a criterion for Turkey’s EU membership
and in 2011, it did not approve a similar proposal by Greeks and Greek-Cypriots.

Human rights, women’s rights, and the freedom of press are just some of the issues
that Turkey faces as a candidate country. It has been estimated that in the aftermath of
the coup the attempted coup against Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and the
Justice and Development Party (AKP) government, more than 50,000 people have been
jailed pending trial and some 150,000 have been sacked or suspended from their jobs in
the military, public and private sector.29

According to the Human Rights Watch, the restrictions that followed were
“symptomatic of the government’s increasing authoritarianism….Under the state of
emergency, the president presides over the cabinet, which can pass decrees without
parliamentary scrutiny or possibility of appeal to the constitutional court;” Decrees
passed include measures that conflict with basic human rights safeguards, such as dismissal from public service without an investigation, confiscation of property without
judicial review, police custody of up to thirty days, reintroduction of incommunicado
detention, namely detainees can be denied access to a lawyer in the first five days of
custody, increasing risks of ill-treatment, and Turkey’s obligations under international
and domestic law.”30

The Human Rights Watch highlights that “Turkey temporarily derogated from
[…] many of the protections in the European Convention on Human Rights and
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, although it is prohibited from
derogating from core obligations, including the absolute prohibition on torture or illtreatment
of detainees […], such as beating and stripping detainees, use of prolonged
stress positions, and threats of rape, as well as threats to lawyers and interference with
medical examinations.”31

For instance, on November 16, 2017, Turkey announced that it would reduce to
the minimum required to retain membership in the Council of Europe human rights
body, because the Council awarded the imprisoned Turkish judge, Murat Arslan, with
the Vaclav Havel Human Rights Prize. Ankara accuses judge Arslan for having links to
2016 “coup” attempt and US-based cleric Fethullah Gulen. Judge Arslan explained in his
message that human rights are being systematically violated in Turkey, “I am addressing
you from a prison in a country where the law is put in brackets, where the values of
democracy are gradually moving away, where dissident voices are silenced, where the
defenders of law, journalists, (and) those who wish for peace are declared terrorists.”32

Similarly, according to Human Rights Watch, the Turkish government has
attempted to “silence” media criticism and has scrutiny government policy in Turkey in
many ways, including canceling press accreditation of critical journalists, threatening,
physical attacking, prosecuting, and jailing them, seizing or closing down media
companies, such as Zaman newspaper, and blocking news websites critical to the
government and has been the only country to have “made the highest number ofrequests
to Twitter of any country to censor individual accounts.”33

Until 2008, the Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code, it was a crime to insult
“Turkishness,” the republic and specific government bodies. However, after the awarded
author, Orhan Pamuk and the journalist, Hrant Dink, had referred on their works on the
Turkey’s Armenians genocide, were among those who were “persecuted under this
provision” for offending “Turkishness.” Dink was murdered in 2007. The European
Human Rights Court characterized this “violation of the basic freedom of expression”
and “condemned the Turkish government for its involvement in the death of Hrant
Dink.” In order to align Turkish law with the EU principles in relation to freedom of the
press and expression, Turkey replaced the terms “Turkishness” and “republic” with
“Turkish nation” and “Republic of Turkey.”34

Likewise, in 2016, more than 1,000 university professors signed a petition
criticizing Turkey’s government policy in the Southeast and supported political
negotiations with the PKK and were “subjected to a criminal investigation for “insulting”
the Turkish state;” this resulted to the dismissal of certain academics-signatories.
International pressure, along with the United Nations Secretary General, contributed to
the release of journalists from unjustified detention. It must be highlighted that Turkey
became “a world leader” in imprisoning journalists, because of the high number of
journalists in pretrial imprisonment due to their writing.35

Regarding Women’s rights, the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women recommended – amongst others – to the government to
address gender inequality and support women’s and girls’ access to education,
employment, reproductive health, and justice, with an emphasis on the difficulties faced
by women and girl refugees, asylum seekers and Kurdish women, as well as on
guaranteeing full access in public hospitals to authorized abortion. The Turkish
government has accepted the Council of Europe Convention on Violence against Women
and Domestic Violence (Istanbul Convention), however, violence against women is still
a crucial issue, because of deaths caused not only by domestic violence, but also by the
so called “honor” killings.

Greek-Turkish Relations

One of the necessary criteria for Turkey’s EU accession is to recognize all the
European member-states, including the Republic of Cyprus and apply the ‘Additional
Protocol to the Ankara Association Agreement’ to Cyprus.” 36 Since the invasion and occupation of a third of Cyprus, Turkey not only to refuses officially recognize Cyprus, a full EU member state since 2004, but also in 1983, established the self-declared “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,” which is only recognized by Turkey, bringing Turkish settlers from Anatolia to Cyprus, in an attempt of the Turkish occupied forces to alter decisively the demographics of the occupied northern part of Cyprus. Turkey’s refusal to recognize the Republic of Cyprus has led to the international isolation of Northern
Cyprus, until Turkey opens the sea ports and airports to Cyprus. Until then, the EU has
frozen eight chapters in Turkey’s EU accession discussions.

In 2004, the Annan Plan for Cyprus was mainly accepted by the Turks and the
Turkish-Cypriots, whereas the majority of the Greek Cypriots rejected it as they felt that
the Annan plan for Cyprus satisfied mainly Turkey’s demands and the interests of the
US, the UK, and Turkey. Some of the major concerns forthe Greek-Cypriots were whether
the proposed government policy would work effectively at practical level, the impact of
the economic development of the occupied part of Cyprus economy to the Greek-Cypriot
economy, the fact that there were no guarantees regarding the security of the Greek-Cypriots, which is related to the issue of the presence of the Turkish settlers on the island,
the failure of protecting the Greek-Cypriots’ human rights on how to exercise, for
example, their profession in Cyprus, the fact that the Greek-Cypriots’ properties would
be undertaken, which is against to the decisions of the European courts, such as Titina
Loizidou’s case, the fact that the Republic of Cyprus would have to pay for the
compensation of the Greek-Cypriot refugees because its economy is stronger than the
economy, creating two competitive economies on the same island, and the fact that all
the Turks would be free to move the Greek-Cypriots side, whereas the Greek-Cypriot
refugees would not be equally aloud to return to their houses.

As the President of International Co-ordinating Committee “Justice for Cyprus”
(PSEKA) in the US, Philip Christopher, said, the agreement of Cyprus on becoming an
EU member-state was to solve the Cyprus Problem and Turkey would continue
becoming a member-state of the EU, which has not happened yet, because, it is true that
[other] European countries, have always been using both Greece and Cyprus, as the
reason why Turkey has not joined the EU. However, he explains, the fact that no country
has recognized the pseudo-state of the Turks in Cyprus, the fact that the Republic of
Cyprus has so many bilateral agreements with the US, the fact that the American
companies are developing in the Republic of Cyprus, to all these a significant role has
played the Omogeneia in the US and these will help us in the future to solve the Cyprus
Problem.37

The President of Cyprus, Nicos Anastasiades, at his greeting at the event at the
Presidential Palace said that “our aim remains Cyprus to be developed as a “normal
country,” as aptly has the UN Secretary General characterize it, far away from guarantees,
far away from intervention rights, far away from the permanent presence of the Turkish
settlers in Cyprus.”38

Apart from the Cyprus Issues, another important issue for Greek-Turkish relations
is the casus belli dispute on Aegean territorial sea borders. As the Professor of
International Politics, Dean of the School of International Studies, Communication and
Culture at Panteion University of Athens-Greece, and Director of the Center of Eastern
Studies, Christodoulos Yiallourides, highlighted that the Greek-Turkish relations are
historically rooted back to the Greek revolution and went through the struggles of the
Greeks for freedom, which ended in 1922 with the Asia Minor destruction. As he further
explained, during the 1950s, the Greek-Turkish relations were defined through the
Cyprus Issues, where the Struggles of the Greeks of Cyprus for self-determination and
Union with Greece found the British against, who involved Turkey and since then the
basic issue of the Greek-Turkish conflict is more related to the Cyprus problem.39

Professor Yiallourides stressed that the Greek-Turkish relations level of conflict
was broadened after 1974 to another context of differences, which, as he said, were discovered by Ankara, in relation to the Aegean Sea and that year was crucial for the
Greek-Turkish relations, because Turkey managed to actually fulfill its old plan of
occupying Cyprus. As he mentioned, Turkey might not have completely occupied
Cyprus – it has occupied the northern part – but tries to control the whole island, through
a solution that negotiates the future of Cyprus, under conditions of Turkish suzerain.

After 1974, Professor Yiallourides clarified that Turkey raised issues of GreekTurkish
relations, such as issues discovered in the Aegean Sea and attempted to renew
the Treaty of Lausanne, which settles, as he said, perfectly all the issues related to the
Aegean Sea, the sovereignty of the Greek islands, the issues of the shelves and air space.
In other words, he said that the Treaty of Lausanne determines the legal framework
between Greece and Turkey as it was set after 1923; it accords, as it should do, the Greek
islands in the Aegean and the Aegean Sea to Greece and recognizes the sovereignty of
Turkey in Asia Minor coastline, along with Imvros and Tenedos islands. “Turkey wants
and demands to renew the Treaty of Lausanne and to dictate conditions of partition in
the Aegean Sea, regarding the undersea and the airspace,” Professor Yiallourides said,
explaining that “The relation is problematic when it comes to the Greek sovereignty.”40

As Professor Yiallourides underlined, the Turkish President, Recep Tayyip
Erdoğan, does not simply bring up the issue of the selves and sea sovereignty, but also
of inhabited areas; President Erdoğan believes that the areas that are closer to Turkey
must be given to Ankara, because Ankara does not recognize the international law as the
system that regulates the relations between the countries, but that the proximity of the
areas: for instance, Turkey argues that Cyprus is not an independent country, it is close
to Turkey, and so it belongs to Turkey and similarly, Turkey considers that the Aegean
islands in the southeastern side of Aegean, such as Chios and Mytilini, must be under the
Turkish sovereignty.

This is proved by President Erdogan’s words at the 79th anniversary from the death
of Ataturk: “Lausanne is a treaty, which along with advantages, has also many losses,”
and President Erdogan added that “the submittals that were made with the National
Oath was the main reason for the security problems that our country [Turkey] faces on
its southern borders today….Those who took us back with the National Oath want us
now to leave behind even the Lausanne [Treaty] and take us back to the Treaty of Sèvres.
But there is something they do not know: current Turkey is not like the yesterday
Turkey,” President Erdogan said.41

The European Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship,
Dimitris Avramopoulos, who participated in the eighth annual Bosporus Summit on
November 28, 2017 in Ankara, Turkey, said that -amongst others- he discussed with
President Erdogan his forthcoming meeting on December 7-8, 2017 with the Prime
Minister of Greece, Alexis Tsipras and the President of Greece, Prokopis Pavlopoulos in Athens, which is going to be the first visit of the President of Turkey to Greece in 65 years:
“Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan hopes that his upcoming visit to Greece will
be a catalyst that can further deepen Greek-Turkish ties in all areas” and they “discussed
Mr. Erdogan’s forthcoming visit to Athens, the success of which can inaugurate a new
era in Greek-Turkish relations, relations that have been tested many times in the past, but
which over the last years have clearly improved. They can improve even further in the
future, to the benefit of both of our peoples and countries.”42

Turkey’s relations with the EU and US

US-Turkey relations are interrelated with EU-Turkey relations and thus, Turkey’s
western future depends on its relationship with the EU and the US. Although the
Ottoman Empire was traditionally against Europe, Turkey’s call for joining Europe dates
back earlier than the EU and the establishment of modern Turkey, as by the end of the
Ottoman Empire, the ruling elite of Constantinople “sought salvation in Westernization,”
yet Ottoman reforms based on the European model could not save the empire; Islamic
pride and the need for westernization contributed to the creation of a split Ottoman
identity in the 19th century.43

The modern Republic of Turkey was established on October 29, 1923, after the fall
of the Ottoman Empire. Its founder was the then army officer Mustafa Kemal Atatürk,
who became the first President of Turkey. President Atatürk applied a number of
reforms, such as industrialization and secularization, restricting the public role ofreligion
– Islam – aiming to Europeanize and Westernize Turkey; changes and alterations were
also mandated on language and dressing style.

During World War II, Turkey was neutral until it finally joined the Allies in 1945,
without participating in the actual war. Turkey joined the United Nations, participated
in the Marshall Plan (1947), and became a member of the Council of Europe (1949), and
NATO (1952). Turkey became a close ally of the United States and Western Europe during
the Cold War; on September 12, 1963, an Association Agreement was signed between the
European Economic Community (EEC) and Turkey However, Turkey’s relations with
Europe and the US have worsened as “Erdogan has been moving away from the West
and its NATO allies and has made a point of looking east to Iran and Russia and the
Middle East” and Erdogan has been criticized “that Turkey has alienated former Western
allies and has become increasingly isolated, and in that sense an improvement of ties with
Greece will be welcomed all around.”44

Besides, it is not a coincidence that the President of the US, Donald Trump, met
with the Prime Minister of Greece, Alexis Tsipras, who was accompanied by the Foreign
Minister of Greece, Nikos Kotzias, the Defense Minister of Greece, Panos Kammenos, the
Minister for Economy and Development of Greece, Dimitri Papadimitriou, and the Minister for Digital Policy of Greece, Nikos Pappas, on October 17, 2017 in Washington,
to discuss, not only military cooperation, but also US. investment in Greece. As reported,
“With Turkey’s political landscape becoming more volatile after the failed coup attempt
in July 2016 against President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Germany’s call for Turkey’s EU
hopes ending, Greece could play a more strategic military role for the United States in the
Mediterranean and Middle East, as well as North Africa. The meeting comes at a time
when US-Turkish relations are at a boiling point. Tensions are rising over a host of issues,
including Ankara’s warming ties to Russia as it pivots away from the EU and NATO
alliance. Recently, the United States and Turkey suspended visa services to each other’s
countries following the arrest of a US consulate employee.”45

Positions on Turkey’s EU Candidacy

Apart from the issues caused between Cyprus and Turkey, during the opening of
other chapters, individual EU member-states expressed reservations with Turkey’s EU
accession and some of them proposed a “privileged partnership” instead. Great Britain
favors Turkey’s full membership to the European Union and put pressure on Cyprus to
accept the Anna plan. France, Austria, Holland, Germany and Finland have been against
Turkey’s EU membership. While EU-Turkey relations are not at their best, UK -Turkey
relations have remained close.46

The former President of France, Nicolas Sarcozy, and the German Chancellor,
Angela Merkel, were against Turkey’s full EU membership. During the conference of the
French governing by that time political party, Union pour un Mouvement Populaire –
U.M.P., Nicolas Sarcozy said:” I want to be the friend of Turkey, but I declare that there
is no place for Turkey in the EU, just because it is extended to Asia Minor. Turkey must
benefit from the privileged partnership status.” He also referred to the meaning of the
European enlargement: “Before we think of the states that they do not belong to Europe,
perhaps we should consider the European countries that belong already to it [Europe]. It
is imperative to do so, so that we will not trap ourselves. All the neighbor countries to
EU. do not have to join EU. If we enlarge the EU forever, then we will diminish the
political union of Europe.”47

European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker at a press conference in
Brussels commenting on the EU-Turkey’s relations said: “I would like Turkey and us to
have the best relations possible but Turkey for the time [being] is stepping away from the
European Union, its basic philosophies, its traditions and ambitions…. “That’s a choice
Turkey has to make, I do think that Turkish authorities are trying to blame the European
Union for having broken the enlargement or accession promise;” He also emphasized
that “We are not doing that but we want Turkey to re-become European.”48

Barack Obama stated during his visit to Turkey in 2009 that “The US. firmly
supports Turkey’s EU candidacy.” At the same time, he expressed the belief that the
Turkish accession would strengthen the European Union.49

The former Minister for Foreign Affairs of France, Bernard Kouchner, said that he
would no longer support the accession of Turkey in the EU, stressing that he was
“extremely shocked” by the Turkish pressures during the process of choosing the Prime
Minister of Denmark, Lars Løkke Rasmussen, for the position of the Secretary General of
NATO, but then added Turkey, under the US pressures fell back, ensuring many
bargains.50

The EU Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship, Dimitris
Avramopoulos, in a written interview with the Turkish newspaper, Hürriyet Daily News,
stressed that Turkey is a “key partnerfor Europe and Europe is a key partner for Turkey.”
He also said that “Europe and Turkey have a shared history and partnership that goes
back several centuries” and that “We are all committed to continue strengthening our
partnership and friendship in all its aspects. Turkey has to continue coming closer to the
EU and to the EU’s democratic values and rules.”51

The Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras noted that “It was important for Turkey
to remain part of the NATO security alliance and continue its orientation towards
Europe despite current tensions between the two countries.”52

Regarding the EU prospect of Turkey, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Greece,
Nikos Kotzias, stressed that it is in Greece’s interest for its neighbor country [Turkey] to
be a European state. He emphasized that Greece would be the last [country] that would
like to stop these discussions.53

The President of Greece, Prokopis Pavlopoulos, at an event where he was declared
honorary citizen in Crete mentioned that “we want a democratic and prosperous Turkey
that will have a European prospect. But for this it demands from the Turkish side, the
total, sincere and in practice respect to the international and the European law. If there
isn’t respect to the international law and to the international treaties, primarily to the
Treaty of Lausanne and the Law of the Sea according to Montego Bay treaty in 1982, then
a real friendship can’t be built.” He further said that “Greece, under its capacity as total
member of the European Union, constitutes a power of peace and safety in the Balkans
and for the wider region but it is always ready to safeguard and protect its territory and
its sovereignty that are also territory and borders of the European Union54.

As the Ecumenical Patriarch and Archbishop of Constantinople-New Rome,
Bartholomew, highlighted, “The European prospect of Turkey encourages our hopes for
a better future,” however, as His All-Holiness added “for the moment we have not seen
anything specific,” explaining that “Neither the [Greek Orthodox Theological School of] Halki has reopened, nor the problems with the properties of our Communities, our Churches and our Institutions have been settled, despite the issuance of the new Vakouf law .…” The Patriarch also said that “Europe always reminds [ Turkey] of its duty to respect the minority rights, especially the religious freedoms, to respect generally the human rights.” 55

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan told the BBC that “If the EU, bluntly says, ‘We
will not be able to accept Turkey into the EU’ this will be comforting for us…” adding that
“The European Union is not indispensable for us… We are relaxed.” He also said that
most of the Turks did not “want the EU anymore” and thought the EU’s approach to
Turkey was “insincere,” arguing that “Despite all this we will continue being sincere with
the EU for a little more time.” President Erdogan denied that Turkey had jailed 150
journalists, explaining that “only two people with press cards were in prison” and the
BBC reported that “Meanwhile, Turkey extended the detention of the local director of
Amnesty International and nine others.”56

During his visit in London, the Turkish Prime Minister, Binali Yildirim, referred
to the European Union and Turkey’s EU accession, “After the Brexit decision the EU is
entirely confused. They need to revisit their vision for the future, how far they are going
to enlarge and what place Turkey will have in that. We are here. We are not going
anywhere.”57

Turkey is not in favor of the “special partnership.” Neither do all the Turks
support the EU membership. Minorities and certain Turkish politicians, and individuals,
like the President of the International Strategic Research Organization (USAK/ISRO),
Sedat Laciner support Turkey’s accession to the EU According to Turkish sources,
Turkey’s EU. membership could be a starting point for a new relationship of Europe with
the Muslim countries, at global level. Europe will have accepted a nation, regardless of
its religion beliefs, focusing on financial prosperity, the social solidarity of the memberstates
and the promotion of common interests. The Turkish-Islam model of western
governing will also be promoted, including the clear division of politics and religion.

However, not all the Turks, who are in favor of Turkey’s accession to Europe, seem
to take into account the point of view of the other Muslim countries, as Islamic countries
are not particularly interested in Turkey’s EU candidacy. On the contrary, they see
Turkey as a “bridgehead of western values at their territory and they do not approve that.
The more Turkey is far away from the West, the better for them….”58

Government officers of the Turkish troops disagree with Turkey’s EU
membership, as they do not intend to give in their institutional and political interests.
Therefore, they oppose Turkey’s EU candidacy. Furthermore, according to an analysis in
Newsweek magazine, surveys show that the popularity of the European idea in Turkey
has lost a great deal of its supporters, reflecting a “tiredness” of the Turkish people due to Brussel’s demands, which is interpreted as reluctance and skepticism on how much finally the EU accession is the question on the economic development and prosperity of the country.59

The development of a special partnership with Turkey will be decided if the EU
will create an EU Constitution and if a “big” Europe decides to include Turkey in some
manner. The development of the EU-Turkish relations will define the European
perspective of Turkey. If Turkey’s EU accession leads to the creation of a special
relationship due to its religion, then the consequences likely will be negative. If Turkey’s
unsuccessful EU accession is based on Turkey’s weakness to fulfill the conditions of entry
on which every single candidate country is obliged to satisfy, no matter what its religion
is, then the consequences will be restricted.

No matter what kind of relationship will be developed between the EU and
Turkey, Great Britain – despite the Brexit – is expected to continue supporting the Turkish
EU accession for its own strategic reasons. According to the confidential papers of the
British Home Office, which were publicized forty years after the Turkish invasion in
Cyprus, in 2004, the future of Cyprus was based on a British “plan” with parameters, to
safeguard the British interests – to retain the bases in Cyprus. This plan has been applied
to a large extent. As long as Turkey is consistent with the British interests, then Turkey
will have British support on issues related to Cyprus and the Aegean. An example of the
actual British support towards Turkey was shown through the British contribution to the
development of the Annan Plan for Cyprus. Cyprus might not be a British colony any
more, however Great Britain continues to exert on Cyprus a policy of predominant
superiority.

It is obvious that Turkey is full of loose ends, not just with Europe and the US, but
also internally. Turkey faces many internal problems, especially when it comes on human
rights protection and the function of democracy. Europe sees Turkey moving away from
its European future, as Turkey has been transformed in practice to an authoritarian and
Islamic country. Germany, France, and Austria have often expressed, through some of
their officials, that they do not wish a full EU membership of Turkey, but rather a special
partnership, perhaps according to the “Brexit model” – if it will be proved successful.
This, despite the fact that might be desirable by Germany and other EU member-states,
it would be perhaps another way for UK-Turkey to continue their plans on Cyprus.

Turkey apparently feels isolated for its positions at European and international
level and recently expressed the need to increase the number of “friends” and restrict the
number of the “enemies.” Recognizing that EU-Turkish relations were conflicting,
especially over the last year, especially with Germany, Holland and Belgium, Erdoğan
said that Turkey wants to have good relations with the EU, hoping that the fact that the
EU and Turkey shared the same opinion on the issue of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, this would be a reason for improving EU-Turkish relations. It is doubtful that Turkey really
wants to join the EU. It seems that Turkey uses its EU. candidacy as a diplomatic pawn
to get other concession. Besides, Turkey strives to become the “leader” of the Arab
countries. A great recent example of Turkey’s attempt to become the leader of the Islamic
world is Turkey’s opposition to Israel, when the US, through Trump, recognized
Jerusalem as Israel’s capital. The Arab countries do not show any trust towards Turkey,
neither show that they want Turkey to lead the way on behalf of the Islamic world. On
the contrary, Turkey, through Erdoğan, had been the “mediator” of Israel to recover
Israeli-Palestine relations and Israeli-Arab countries in general. The Arab world
considered Erdoğan closer to Israel than to them and do not accept Turkey’s leadership
in the Arab countries.

US-Turkish relations have also altered. Turkey, the “traditional” ally of the US,
cooperates with Russia and Iran and accuses the US of being involved with the failed
coup in Turkey, as the US denies that Gülen has any connection to the coup. The US. says
that Turkey has not provided adequate information to extradite Gülen from the US. to
Turkey. Turkey has been opposed to the US in a non-diplomatic way by arresting staff
working at the US consulate in Constantinople under the accusation that there are
connections with Gülen. It also stopped offering full visa services to Americans to which
the US responded accordingly in regard to the visa services to the Turks. The US does not
show trust to Turkey, although the US tries to deal with Turkey in a diplomatic way,
recognizing that US staff might be in danger.

Despite the fact that democratization of Turkey was occurring in theory, and not
in real terms, Greece supports Turkey’s EU candidacy, as it is believed that a
Europeanized Turkey will be much more preferred than an Islamic Turkey. To this
context the first visit of the President of Turkey in 65 years was paid recently to Greece in
a period of time that Turkey had been isolated for its positions from other countries.
Greece hopes by acting as it does that Turkey will finally respect international and
European law, including the Lausanne Treaty, and therefore the status quo in the Aegean
Sea. Cyprus hoped that by joining the EU, it would put pressure on Turkey to recognize
the Republic of Cyprus. Cyprus will block Turkey’s EU candidacy until Turkey applies
the ‘Additional Protocol to the Ankara Association Agreement’ to Cyprus. Realizing that
Turkey all these years continues not to comply with the European framework and not to
recognize the Republic of Cyprus, the question that arises is whether Cyprus should try
figure an alternative way that would solve the Cyprus problem. Taking into account that
Turkey’s position as a western ally has been weakened, and that Cyprus, along with
Greece, have managed to become allies with countries such as Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan
and Israel, that have closer ties with the US and not in the same way as with Turkey. This
might prove useful as a “tool” of pressure for Turkey to improve Greek and Cypriot
relations with Turkey.

————–

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2 Europarl.europa.eu. (2017). The Enlargement of the Union EU fact sheets
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3
Ibid.
4
Ibid.
5
Ibid.
6
Ibid.
7 Drupal. (2017). Accession Negotiations. https://www.avrupa.info.tr/en/accession negotiations- 720
[Accessed 9 Nov. 2017].
8 Eur-lex.europa.eu, (2017).
9 Europarl.europa.eu. (2017).
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12Avrupa.info.tr. (2017). EU and Turkey’s History | EU in Turkey. [online]
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13 Nathalie Tocci. Turkey’s European Future: Behind the Scenes of America’s Influence on EU-Turkey
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14 Despina Afentouli. The Position of the British Press in the Greek-Turkish Relations, 1955-1965.
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15 Avrupa.info.tr, (2017)
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17 Europarl.europa.eu, (2017).
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19 Ibid.
20 Europarl.europa.eu, (2017).
21 Ibid.
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27 The Economist. (2017) http://www.economist.com/node/3500259 [Accessed 28 Nov. 2017] and
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28 Afentouli, 2012. p. 130.
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36 Europarl.europa.eu
37 Afentouli, D. (2017). The Cyprus Issue-Aegean: Promotion of national issues in the U.S. [Κυπριακό-
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38 Riknews.com.cy, 2017.
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40 Ibid.

41 Mignatiou.com. (2017). Erdogan’s new challenge: The Lausanne Treaty caused “losses” to the Southern suburbs of Turkey [Νέα πρόκληση Ερντογάν: Η Λωζάνη προκάλεσε “ζημιές” στα νότια σύνορα
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44 Gall, C. (2017). Trump may open US wallet for debt-ridden NATO ally Greece at urgent time. [online]
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48 Anadolu Agency, 2017
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Source: http://www.ahifworld.org/uploads/1/1/7/1/117198244/5-turkey_as_an_eu_candidate_country.pdf